The Minnesota Statutes revolving fund may pay the cost of printing the court rules as a part of the cost of publishing the Minnesota Statutes. OAG Aug. 8, 1951 (500).

480.06 DECISIONS

Judgment of appellate court, like any other judgment is res judicata of questions litigated and decided. Mitchell v City of St. Paul, 228 M 64, 36 NW(2d) 132.

480.07 CLERK; BOND, ASSISTANCE, RECORDS

HISTORY. 1858 c 9 s 1-3; PS 1858 c 5 s 86-89; GS 1866 c 6 s 60-62; GS 1878 c 6 s 62-64; 1881 c 160 s 1; GS 1878 Vol 2 (1888 Supp) c 7 s 1; GS 1894 s 374-377; RL 1905 s 75, 76; GS 1913 s 127, 128; 1921 c 46 s 1.

480.09 STATE LIBRARY

HISTORY. 1903 c 272 s 1-7; RL 1905 s 78-82; GS 1913 s 130-134; 1947 c 365 s 4; 1951 c 3 s 1.

Under the provisions of Laws 1949, Chapter 740, Section 51, during the fiscal years ending June 30, 1950 and 1951, the provisions of section 480.09 were superseded insofar as they related to any receipts of the state library, and all receipts of the state library during those fiscal years were required to be deposited in the state treasury and credited to the general revenue fund. The librarian could turn in old books to apply on the purchase price of new ones. OAG May 22, 1950 (9-A).

480.11 REPORTER

HISTORY. M Const art 6 s 2; RS 1851 c 69 art 1 s 7; 1852 c 38 s 1-3; PS 1858 c 56 s 2; 1865 c 34 s 1-3; GS 1866 c 27 s 1, 2; GS 1878 c 27 s 1, 2; 1881 c 103 s 1, 2; GS 1878 Vol 2 (1888 Supp) c 27 s 5, 6; GS 1894 s 2278-2282; 1895 c 22, 23; 1901 c 3; RL 1905 s 84-86; GS 1913 s 136-138.

480.12 PRINTING MINNESOTA REPORTS

HISTORY. 1865 c 34 s 4; GS 1866 c 27 s 4; GS 1878 c 27 s 4; 1885 c 218 s 1, 2; 1887 c 230 s 1, 2; GS 1878 Vol 2 (1888 Supp) c 27 s 4a, 4b, 13, 14; 1889 c 116 s 1; 1889 c 240 s 1, 2; 1889 c 241 s 1-3; 1893 c 18 s 1, 2; GS 1894 s 2280, 2284-94; RL 1905 s 88, 89; 1913 s 140, 142; 1917 c 407 s 3; 1921 c 509 s 1; GS 1923 c 151-153; 1895 c 22, 23; 1903 c 129; RL 1905 s 87; GS 1913 s 139; 1927 c 379 s 1; 1937 c 81 s 1.

CHAPTER 481

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

481.01 BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS; EXAMINATIONS

HISTORY. RS 1851 c 93 s 1-4, 8; 1856 c 5; PS 1858 c 82 s 1-4, 8; GS 1866 c 88 s 1-4, 8; 1877 c 123 s 1; GS 1878 c 88 s 1-4, 8; 1883 c 104; 1889 c 93; 1891 c 36 s 1-7; 1893 c 129 s 1; GS 1894 s 6172-6177; RL 1905 s 2278; GS 1913 s 4945; 1921 c 161 s 1; 1953 c 167 s 1.

Integration of the bar and judicial responsibility. 32 MLR 1.

Power to suspend an attorney from practice before an administrative board or agency. 32 MLR 63.

Legal education in the United States. 38 MLR 90.

The Minnesota State Bar Association petitioned the Supreme Court for an order integrating the bar, deeming it advisable and where the sentiment of the bar, a plebiscite was ordered. In a secret ballot, 1,079 members of the bar voted for integration and 1,081 voted against integration. Sixteen of the district associations voted in favor of integration and four voted against. There not being a sufficient sentiment among the lawyers favoring integration, the Minnesota State Bar Association asked for and the court granted a dismissal of the proceedings without prejudice to later renewing the petition. Re Integration of the Bar of Minnesota, 226 M 578, 34 NW(2d) 157.

While the professional standards for safeguarding public interest must be sufficiently flexible to allow for adaptation to changes in conditions, they must always have such stability and permanence as to protect the individual practitioner in the enjoyment of his professional franchise in order to induce men of ability and character to undergo the years of training necessary to qualify them as attorneys. Gardner v Conway, 234 M 468, 48 NW(2d) 788.

If a complaint charging professional misconduct on the part of an attorney has been referred by the supreme court to the practice of law committee of the state bar association, and expenses not inconsistent with the order of the court have been incurred by that committee in the investigating, handling, and prosecution of such complaint, and if the expenses are properly certified as having been so incurred by the committee and approved by the court, they may be legally paid to the association for the purpose of reimbursing that association for funds expended. OAG June 25, 1947 (275-A).

481.02 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

Laymen practicing before state administrative commissions as engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 31 MLR 288.

Power to suspend an attorney from practice before an administrative board or agency. 32 MLR 63.

Unauthorized practice of law; certified public accountant; taxation. 33 MLR 445.

Removal of causes under the revised judicial code. 33 MLR 738.

The opportunity to exercise undue influence, or the existence of a confidential relation between testator and beneficiary are not, standing alone, proof of undue influence; and the fact that a lawyer drew the will and that the witnesses to the will observed no undue influence do not alone establish the absence thereof; an impeachment testimony consisting of prior statements of the witness out of court is not substantive proof of facts stated therein, but is purely negative for the purpose of impairing the credibility of the witness. Olson v Mork, 227 M 289, 35 NW(2d) 439.

"Testamentary capacity" means that the testator at the time of making his will comprehended his relation to those who naturally have claims on his bounty, the extent and situation of his property, and the effect of the will disposing of it, and that he was able to hold these things in mind long enough to form a rational judgment concerning them. Where the evidence as to testamentary capacity and undue influence is conflicting, findings of the trial court with respect to such questions are final, even though the appellate court, if it had the power to try the question de novo, might determine otherwise upon reading the record. In re Olson's Estate, 227 M 289, 35 NW(2d) 439.

A will drawn for testator by a bank cashier in violation of a statute against the unauthorized practice of law is not invalid. Peterson v Hovland, 230 M 478, 42 NW(2d) 59.

A proceeding to adjudge a person in contempt of court for the unauthorized practice of law, whether such unauthorized practice occurred within or outside the presence of the court, is punitive and criminal in its nature and is primarily brought in the public interest to vindicate the authority of the court and to deter other like derelictions.

A conviction for a criminal contempt, as distinguished from a civil contempt, is not appealable, but must be reviewed by certiorari.

The district court has jurisdiction to enjoin the unauthorized practice of law, whether such practice takes place within or outside the presence of the court, and such jurisdiction is not destroyed by the criminality of the defendant's misconduct.

A justiciable issue may arise although the purported acts of unauthorized practice of law were intentionally performed by defendant upon the mistaken assumption that he was then advising a bona fide taxpayer and was preparing for him a tax return for use in reporting an actual taxpayer's income.

The purpose for which lawyers are licensed as the exclusive occupants of their field is to protect the public from the intolerable evils which are brought upon people by those who assume to practice law without having the proper qualifications.

The law practice franchise or privilege is based upon the threefold requirements of ability, character, and responsible supervision.

A layman's legal service activities are the practice of law unless they are incidental to his regular calling; but the mere fact that they are incidental is by no means decisive.

Generally speaking, whenever, as incidental to another transaction or calling, a layman, as part of his regular course of conduct, resolves legal questions for another, at the latter's request and for a consideration, by giving him advice or by taking action for and in his behalf, he is practicing law if difficult or doubtful legal questions are involved which, to safeguard the public, reasonably demand the application of a trained legal mind.

What is a difficult or doubtful question of law is not to be measured by the comprehension of a trained legal mind, but by the understanding thereof which is possessed by a reasonably intelligent layman who is reasonably familiar with similar transactions.

In restraining laymen from improper activity, the difficult question of law criterion is to be applied in a common-sense way which will protect primarily the interest of the public and not hamper or burden that interest with impractical and technical restrictions which have no reasonable justification.

When an accountant or other layman who is employed to prepare an income tax return is faced with difficult or doubtful questions of the interpretation or application of statutes, administrative regulations and rulings, court decisions, or general law, it is his duty to leave the determination of such questions to a lawyer.

The work of an accountant disassociated from the resolving of difficult or doubtful questions of law is not law practice.

Although the preparation of the income tax return was not of itself the practice of law, defendant herein, incidental to such preparation, resolved certain difficult legal questions which, taken as a whole, constituted the practice of law.

A layman, whether he is or is not an accountant, may not hold himself out to the public as a tax consultant or a tax expert, or describe himself by any similar phrase which implies that he has a knowledge of tax law. Gardner v Conway, 234 M 468, 48 NW(2d) 790.

A court of equity will enjoin the unlawful practice of law at the suit of a bar association; but the giving of legal advice or information by an industrial relations consultant, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information and provided the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major nonlegal problem, is not unlawful practice of law. Auerbacher v Wood, 53 Atlantic 800.

481.03 ATTORNEYS SHALL NOT EMPLOY SOLICITORS

Injunction against solicitation and importation of legal business. 34 MLR 554.

The test is whether the conduct of the attorney comes up to a standard set by the Canons of Ethics, and proof of wrong doing must be cogent and compelling,

although proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary. In the instant case the evidence supported the referee's findings that the attorney was not guilty of organized solicitation. In re Rerat, 232 M 1, 44 NW(2d) 273.

Proceedings to discipline an attorney are sui generis and not the trial of an action or a suit between adverse parties. It is an inquiry by the court into the conduct of one of its officers for the purpose of determining his fitness to continue as a member of his profession. The referee's findings are generally treated in the same manner as are the findings of a court or jury. In re Rerat, 232 M 1, 44 NW(2d) 273.

481.05 VIOLATIONS; PENALTIES

Injunction against solicitation and importation of legal business. 34 MLR 554.

481.06 GENERAL DUTIES

Integration of the bar. 32 MLR 1.

Attorney-client relationship. 36 MLR 169.

An attorney is personally liable to a third party if he maliciously participates with others in an abuse of process or if he maliciously encourages and induces another to act as his instrumentality in committing an act constituting an abuse of process. Hoppe v Klapperich, 224 M 224, 28 NW(2d) 784.

Because of want of capacity, minors cannot waive their rights to due process or notice; and likewise counsel for a minor cannot waive such minor's constitutional rights. Re Wretlind, 225 M 554, 32 NW(2d) 163.

Plaintiff, an attorney and expert accountant, was employed by a defendant, a merchant, to represent him in connection with a controversy that had arisen between defendant and the Office of Price Administration because of overcharges by defendant in the sale of goods above the ceiling price established by the administration, on the basis of "15 percent of the difference between the maximum violations and the amount actually settled for with the Office of Price Administration," the contract was not void as against public policy, that plaintiff performed the contract, that in the performance of the contract plaintiff used no illegal or unlawful means, and that he is therefore entitled to recover. Weinstein v Palmer, 226 M 64, 32 NW(2d) 154.

It is entirely improper for counsel to become a witness for his client in a case which he is trying, but occasionally an emergency develops where the attorney is compelled to testify in order to protect his client's interest and assist in the furtherance of justice. When such emergency occurs, it is within the trial court's discretion to decide whether the testimony of the attorney should be admissible. In the instant case where the trial judge permitted the attorney to testify, there was no abuse of discretion. Hagerty v Radle, 228 M 487, 37 NW(2d) 819.

The practice of law franchise or privilege is based upon the threefold requirements of ability, character, and responsible supervision. Gardner v Conway, 234 M 468, 48 NW(2d) 788.

481.08 AUTHORITY

HISTORY. RS 1851 c 93 s 10; 1852 Amendment p 18 s 80; PS 1858 c 82 s 10; GS 1866 c 88 s 9; GS 1878 c 88 s 9; GS 1894 s 6184; RL 1905 s 2283; GS 1913 s 4950.

Attorneys authorized to represent the United States in court in proceedings dealing with administrative law; extent of authority of counsel for the federal trade commission. 32 MLR 606.

An attorney is personally liable to a third party if he maliciously participates with others in an abuse of process or if he maliciously encourages and induces another to act as his instrumentality in committing an act constituting an abuse of process. Hoppe v Klapperich, 224 M 224, 28 NW(2d) 784.

An attorney's duties to his client yields to conflicting duties owed by him to the public as an officer of the court. Hoppe v Klapperich, 224 M 224, 28 NW(2d) 780.

So long as the stipulation remains in effect it is binding not only upon the parties but on the trial and appellate courts as well; and since a stipulation excludes a consideration of other evidence once it appears that the parties have abandoned the stipulation other evidence may not be considered even though it may find its way into the record. Rules relating to stipulations apply in workmen's compensation cases. Lappinen v Union Ore Co., 224 M 395, 29 NW(2d) 8.

An attorney commencing an action presumably has authority to prepare the pleadings, and to overcome that presumption when the pleadings are sought to be introduced as an admission or for the purpose of an impeachment. The party against whom the pleadings are offered may show that he did not have knowledge of the contents of the pleadings. Carlson v Fredsall, 228 M 461, 37 NW(2d) 744.

Though an attorney has no employed authority to engage an associate counsel and impose upon his client a liability for the fees of such associate, if a client ratifies the unauthorized employment of such an associate he subjects himself to liability therefor. Culhane v Burness, 236 M 256, 52 NW(2d) 451.

An attorney's authority to act for a client terminates with the client's death. Where a notice of appeal was served on the defendant's attorney after defendant's death, and the records and briefs on appeal were served upon the attorney for the executrix, who was substituted as defendant after her appointment, and the attorney for the executrix petitioned for an extension of time in which to file an answering brief, and after denial of the petition, moved to dismiss for lack of service of notice of appeal, the acts of the executrix and her counsel constituted a ratification of the acceptance of service by the attorney by the original defendant. Bergum v Palmborg, ... M ....., 58 NW(2d) 722.

481.13 FEES, LIEN

HISTORY. RS 1851 c 93 s 16; PS 1858 c 82 s 16; GS 1866 c 88 s 15; GS 1878 c 88 s 16; GS 1894 s 6194; RL 1905 s 2288; GS 1913 s 4955; 1917 c 98; 1939 c 394.

Enforcement of attorney's liens in bankruptcy cases. 35 MLR 83.

An order allowing attorney's fees for services to a trust estate affected a substantial right of attorneys and was appealable or subject to modification by motion or other form of direct attack; but it could not be granted or modified in a collateral proceeding. But where, upon undisputed facts disclosed by the record, the trial court is fully informed that pursuant to a prior and final adjudication the reasonable value of services to the trust estate has been determined and paid for, affirmative defense of res judicata as a bar to a second allowance and payment for the same service is within the judicial knowledge of the trial court and may be considered for the first time on appeal. Atwood v Holmes, 229 M 37, 38 NW(2d) 63.

In the proceedings for the allowance to respondent of attorneys' fees and expenses, the trial court specifically found that: (a) the terms of the trust instruments were ambiguous and uncertain in meaning and that they had been construed at different times in different ways; (b) that litigation was necessary to resolve these ambiguities in meaning as a prerequisite to a determination of the present and future rights of all parties concerned; (c) that respondent in his representative capacity was a necessary and proper party to this litigation; (d) that all litigation in which respondent participated and all the legal services performed and expenses incurred in connection therewith were necessary and proper and were of benefit to all the beneficiaries and to the trustees in resolving the trust-instrument ambiguities and in procuring a final adjudication of the respective rights of the beneficiaries and of the duties of the trustees; and (e) that the respective sums of $4,000 and $814.58 for attorneys' fees and expenses were reasonable. Atwood v Holmes, 229 M 37, 35 NW(2d) 736.

Litigants are usually bound upon appeal by theories, however erroneous and improvident, upon which the case was tried in the lower court. The appellate court has a duty to, and upon its own motion may, determine a case upon the ground of

illegality, though such ground was neither presented to nor considered by the trial court, if such illegality is apparent upon the undisputed facts, is in clear contravention of public policy, and if a decision thereon will be decisive of the controversy on its merits. Atwood v Holmes, 227 M 495, 38 NW(2d) 63.

Sound public policy imposes a positive duty upon the courts to exercise an affirmative vigilance in protecting trust estates from depletion from unnecessary or illegal expenditures; and an order allowing attorney's fees for services to a trust estate affecting a substantial right of attorneys was appealable and subject to modification by motion or other form of direct attack, but it could not be questioned or modified in a collateral proceeding. Atwood v Holmes, 227 M 495, 38 NW(2d) 65.

Where plaintiff received no notice of proceedings to establish the defendant's right to additional attorneys' fees but appeared voluntarily with counsel at the hearing therein and testified, presented other evidence and otherwise participated therein by such appearance, the plaintiff was estopped from subsequently questioning the trial court's jurisdiction in connection with such proceedings. McDonald v Johnson, 229 M 119, 38 NW(2d) 197.

Under MSA, Section 481.13, attorneys' lien for fees in divorce proceeding became impressed upon $20,000 lump-sum alimony payment ordered by divorce decree.

Attorneys' lien having attached to $20,000 lump-sum payment in divorce proceeding, subsequent stipulation of parties and order of court eliminating lump-sum alimony payment and requiring that such amount be paid in future installments did not nullify such lien. McDonald v Johnson, 229 M 119, 38 NW(2d) 197.

In an action for divorce before trial the parties affected a reconciliation and dismissed the action and on the day following the dismissal, the plaintiff's attorney filed a notice of attorney's lien, the court has jurisdiction in a summary proceeding to compel an attorney to account to a client for money or property which has come into his possession and which he has no right to retain. Whether in a particular proceeding the attorney should be made to account in a summary proceeding or the client put to his remedy by an action at law rests largely in the discretion of the trial court. It is not necessary that the relation of attorney and client exist before the court may act. Attorney's liens for services are governed by statute in this state. Our lien statute is a substitute for the common-law lien. After dismissal of a suit for divorce, no attorney's lien may be established. Akers v Akers, 233 M 133, 46 NW(2d) 87.

Section 481.13 is a substitute for and supersedes the common law rules relating to attorney's lien. The method for giving constructive notice provided by section 481.13 is exclusive. Newman v Sauers, 235 M 140, 47 NW(2d) 769.

An attorney's lien on his client's cause of action is superior to the rights of a judgment creditor of the plaintiff or the assignee of such judgment creditor. The right to offset one judgment against another is not statutory but is an incident of the general jurisdiction of the court over its suitors and is of an equitable character. Ordinarily a court, in the exercise of its authority to set off one judgment against another, will not do so if it will defeat an attorney's lien. LaFleur v Schiff, ... M ....., 58 NW(2d) 320.

An attorney appearing in a condemnation procedure on behalf of the respondent may have a statutory lien for his fee. The one making payment is bound to take notice of the attorney's statutory lien. The inclusion of the name of an attorney in a state warrant issued in the payment of an award, verdict or settlement, who has appeared for a respondent in a condemnation proceeding is an appropriate, effective and salutary safeguard against any liability on the part of the state arising out of the attorney's statutory lien and such inclusion is proper. OAG March 9, 1953 (229-D-3).

481.14 REFUSAL TO SURRENDER PROPERTY TO CLIENTS

HISTORY. RS 1851 c 93 s 17, 18; PS 1858 c 82 s 17, 18; GS 1866 c 88 s 16, 17; 1877 c 35.s 1; GS 1878 c 88 s 17, 18; GS 1894 s 6195, 6196; RL 1905 s 2289; GS 1913 s 4956.

The right of an attorney to a lien is based upon his possession of the documents for property upon which he was employed and has rendered service. 35 MLR 83.

481.15 REMOVAL OR SUSPENSION

Power of administrative board to suspend an attorney from practicing before it. 32 MLR 63.

An action for the discipline of an attorney is neither a civil action nor a criminal proceeding, but is a proceeding sui generis, the object of which is not the punishment of the offender, but the protection of the court in the interest of the public good. Although such inquiry must not be encumbered by technical rules, it is essential that the requirements of due process be observed, and charges must be clear, specific, and sufficient to afford the respondent an opportunity to prepare and present his defense. In re Rerat, 224 M 124, 28 NW(2d) 169.

On account of the heinous moral turpitude of the offense for which the applicant was convicted and for which he was disbarred, the supreme court is not justified in appointing a referee to take testimony in support of or at opposition to the application for reinstatement. Application of Van Wyck, 225 M 90, 29 NW(2d) 654.

Misappropriation of a client's money by an attorney at law is ground for disbarment; and pending civil actions by former clients against the attorney to recover moneys so misappropriated is not ground for dismissing disbarment proceeding. Re O'Malley, 225 M 387, 30 NW(2d) 693.

In the instant disciplinary proceedings, the evidence being insufficient to establish wilful or intentional wrongdoing on the part of the attorney the proceedings are dismissed. In re Witherow, 226 M 58, 32 NW(2d) 176.

In a disciplinary proceeding, the burden of proof is on the petitioner. In the instant case, the evidence was insufficient to establish wilful or intentional wrongdoing. The petitioner did not sustain the burden of proof. Re Witherow, 226 M 58, 32 NW(2d) 176.

Application by practice of law committee to open disciplinary proceeding to permit presentation of additional evidence before referee whose report was before supreme court would be denied on basis of conclusion that such evidence would not change findings of referee. In re Rerat, 227 M 248, 35 NW(2d) 291.

Proceedings to discipline an attorney are sui generis and not the trial of an action or a suit between adverse parties. It is an inquiry by the court into the conduct of one of its officers for the purpose of determining the fitness to continue as a member of his profession. The referee's findings are generally treated in the same manner as are the findings of a court or jury. In re Rerat, 232 M 1, 44 NW(2d) 273.

The test is whether the conduct of the attorney comes up to a standard set by the Canons of Ethics, and proof of wrongdoing must be cogent and compelling, although proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary. In the instant case the evidence supported the referee's findings that the attorney was not guilty of organized solicitation. In re Rerat, 232 M 1, 44 NW(2d) 273.

In proceeding to discipline an attorney the question is the fitness of the attorney to continue as a member of the legal profession, and the test is whether the conduct is within the standard set by the Canons of Ethics. In re Rerat, 232 M 1, 44 NW(2d) 273.

Respondent having been convicted of grand larceny, a felony, his disbarment from the practice of law must be ordered. In re King, 232 M 327, 45 NW(2d) 562.

An attorney may be disbarred for conduct indicative of moral unfitness even though such conduct did not relate to his profession. There is no statute of limitations in actions for disbarment. This is particularly true where the delay in disciplinary action was caused by the flight of the defendant from the state to avoid trial for his immoral acts and his absence from the state for five years. In re Heinze, 233 M 391, 47 NW(2d) 123.

Where the evidence sustained charges of an attorney's misconduct and indicated that he fled the state to escape prosecution thereon, disbarment was justified even though prior to his flight he had been acquitted on one of the charges. An attorney may be disbarred for conduct indicative of moral unfitness whether such conduct be relative to the profession or otherwise. In re Heinze, 233 M 391, 47 NW(2d) 123.

Attorneys as officers of the court are subject to inherent supervisory jurisdiction which embraces the power to remove from the profession those practitioners who are unfaithful or incompetent in the discharge of their trust. Gardner v Conway, 234 M 468, 48 NW(2d) 788.

A lack of absolute integrity in the handling of a client's funds and in conducting financial transactions with others, whether it stems from the habitual and excessive use of liquor or from an innate weakness of character, disqualifies a lawyer from continuing the practice of his profession. In re Boland, ... M ....., 57 NW(2d) 809.

Where an attorney's record, professional and otherwise, was practically unblemished prior to conviction for criminal negligence in the operation of an automobile, the attorney would not be disbarred but merely suspended from the practice of law for six months. In re Swagler, ... M ....., 58 NW(2d) 272.

CHAPTER 482

REVISOR OF STATUTES

"When in 1945 the legislature adopted and enacted the compilation and revision of the general statutes of this state as the 'Minnesota Revised Statutes,' it thereby recognized and declared the same to be an official compilation, revision, and code. As such, the language chosen and used in the revised statutes must be given effect as the latest expression of the legislative will. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction and interpretation." State ex rel v Washburn, 224 M 269, 28 NW(2d) 652.

482.02 APPOINTMENT, SALARY

HISTORY. 1939 c 442 s 2; 1947 c 617 s 7; 1949 c 739 s 16.

482.04, 482.05 Repealed, 1943 c 545 s 5.

482.06 Superseded.

482.07 PRINTING, PUBLICATION, AND DISTRIBUTION OF SESSION LAWS

HISTORY. RL 1905 s 2276; 1907 c 115 s 2; GS 1913 s 4942; GS 1923 s 5681; 1925 c 101 s 1; MS 1927 s 5681; 1945 c 65 s 2; 1947 c 617 s 9.

When any laws are enacted which should be inserted between sections of the statutes in force at the time of the enactment of the new laws, the new laws are inserted in the proper order according to the decimal system, and the decimal system is sufficiently flexible as to permit the insertion of a new law in its proper place and in logical sequence. OAG Sept. 16, 1949 (500).

482.09 DUTIES

Bill drafting division created in the office of revisor of statutes. 33 MLR 52.

482.15 INDEX OF SESSION LAWS

HISTORY. 1949 c 305 s 1.