

1940 Supplement
To
Mason's Minnesota Statutes
1927

(1927 to 1940)
(Superseding Mason's 1931, 1934, 1936 and 1938
Supplements)

Containing the text of the acts of the 1929, 1931, 1933, 1935, 1937 and 1939 General Sessions,
and the 1933-34, 1935-36, 1936 and 1937 Special Sessions of the Legislature, both new and
amendatory, and notes showing repeals, together with annotations from the
various courts, state and federal, and the opinions of the Attorney
General, construing the constitution, statutes, charters
and court rules of Minnesota together with digest
of all common law decisions.



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10912. Stay of sentence.

See §§208-1 to 208-9.

10915-8. Same—Contingent fund for expenses.—

A contingent fund of \$2,500 per annum for the payment of transportation and incidental expenses incurred shall be set aside in the treasury of said county annually to be paid out only upon order of the court upon proper vouchers. Such probation officer, assistant probation officer or deputy probation officers may be allowed the sum of five cents per mile for actual mileage traveled when using their own automobiles in the performance of their duties which shall be paid to them monthly out of the above fund. ('23, c. 289, §8; Apr. 21, 1939, c. 362, §1.)

Editorial note.—Sec. 3 of Act Apr. 21, 1939, cited, provides that the act shall take effect Jan. 1, 1940.

The title of the act purports to amend "Laws 1923, chapter 289, sections 8, 12, and 16, as amended." The body of the act does not amend §16.

10915-11. Same—Annual report.

The county board of Ramsey County, the probation officer and the judge of district court may, in their discretion, print copies of annual report of probation officer of juvenile court and distribute them among welfare agencies, priests and ministers. Op. Atty. Gen., May 26, 1931.

10915-12. Same—Salaries to be fixed by district judges.—The chief probation officer, assistant probation officer, deputy probation officers and all other employees in the office of the probation officer shall receive such compensation as shall be fixed by the judges of the district court of any such county. ('23 c. 289, §12; '27, c. 420, §3; '29, c. 380; Apr. 20, 1931, c. 257; Apr. 15, 1935, c. 190; Apr. 21, 1939, c. 362, §2.)

See note under §10915-8.

Part V. Construction of Statutes and Express Repeals

CHAPTER 107

Statutes

THE REVISED LAWS AND THEIR EFFECT

10918. How cited—When to take effect—Session laws not affected.

Revisor of statutes created. Laws 1939, c. 442.

10922. Continuation of former laws.

An intent to change the law will not be lightly inferred from a mere change of phraseology in a revision. Gilroy's Estate, 193M349, 258NW584. See Dun. Dig. 8961.

A revision of existing statutes is presumed not to have changed their meaning, even if there be phraseological alterations, unless an intention to change clearly appears from language of revised statute when considered in connection with subject-matter of act and its legislative history. State v. Montague, 195M278, 262NW684. See Dun. Dig. 8961.

Reenacted statute should receive the known, settled construction which it had received when previously in force. Wenger v. W., 200M436, 274NW517. See Dun. Dig. 8965.

CONSTRUCTION

10928. When to take effect.

Amending act which did not specifically provide when it was to take effect went into effect from and after its approval. Venteicher, 202M331, 278NW581. See Dun. Dig. 8946.

A tax statute, like any other statute will not be given a retrospective effect in the absence of an express command or a necessary implication. Board of Education v. A., 285NW80. See Dun. Dig. 9173.

Act takes effect the beginning of the day following its approval. Op. Atty. Gen., Apr. 9, 1929.

Laws 1933, c. 251, approved on April 15, became operative on April 16. Op. Atty. Gen., June 24, 1933.

Rule against retroactive legislation as a basic principle of jurisprudence. 20 MinnLawRev 775.

10929. Revision to operate as repeal, when.

State v. Schimelpfenig, 192M55, 255NW258; note under §§297, 10933(21).

Section 1538-1 does not repeal or modify the provisions of the charter of the City of St. Paul providing for condemnation of land for street and highway purposes. 177M146, 225NW86.

When two legislative acts are not expressly repugnant, but later act covers entire subject-matter of earlier and does not purport to amend it, and if it plainly appears that later act was intended as a substitute for earlier, it will operate as a repeal of former. Board of Education v. B., 192M367, 256NW894. See Dun. Dig. 8926.

If a statute is manifestly inconsistent with a prior statute covering the same subject, it repeals it, in whole or pro tanto, without any repealing clause, in absence of an expressed intention to contrary. Bemis Bro. Bag Co. v. W., 197M216, 266NW690. See Dun. Dig. 8927.

Prior statutes may be resorted to for purpose of solving, but not to create, an ambiguity, and if language of revision indicates an intention to adopt meaning of a prior statute, revised statute will be given that effect. Wenger v. W., 200M436, 274NW517. See Dun. Dig. 8961.

10930. Effect of repeal.

Sheriff agreeing to pay detective \$25 for each conviction for violation of liquor laws could pay such amount in pending cases for convictions occurring after effective date of Laws 1933, c. 130. Op. Atty. Gen., Apr. 28, 1933.

10931. Amendments validated.

An erroneous reference included in an amendatory act identifying statute to be amended may be eliminated as surplusage and statute read as corrected, where legislative intention is clear. Bull v. K., 286NW311. See Dun. Dig. 8985.

10932. Rules of construction.

½. Rules of construction in general.

Taxing statutes are generally construed with strictness. Webber v. K., (CCA8), 97F(2d)921.

Where legislative intent is reasonably apparent, court may properly disregard punctuation or repunctuate if necessary, to arrive at natural meaning of language used. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. E., (DC-Minn), 23F Supp70.

Legislative re-enactment of a statute will not validate an erroneous interpretation of it by an administrative official. Hanson v. L., (DC-Minn), 24FSupp535.

An erroneous construction of a revenue statute by an administrative officer is not binding on the courts. Id.

The court may look to the legislative history in construing a statute when there may be doubt on the subject. Twin Ports Oil Co. v. P., (DC-Minn), 26FSupp366.

Prima facie effect of similar South Dakota law construed. Berlin v. K., 183M278, 236NW307. See Dun. Dig. 8821, 8937a(99), 8956.

As between a statutory provision with special and limited application, and another, general in scope, special controls general within former's limited field. Rosenquist v. O., 187M375, 245NW621. See Dun. Dig. 8970.

Ambiguity will be resolved in favor of state. State v. Walsh, 188M412, 247NW523. See Dun. Dig. 8990.

Literal meaning of statute is not always conclusive, and there must be resort to construction when words, otherwise plain, result in ambiguity when applied to their subject-matter. State v. Walsh, 188M523, 247NW523. See Dun. Dig. 8938.

Strict construction of statutes in derogation of common law must not be used as cover for extraconstitutional limitations on legislative power. State v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 190M162, 251NW275. See Dun. Dig. 1602.

However radical its change, a statute is not to be so narrowed by construction as to defeat its purpose, simply because it is an innovation on common-law principles. Id. See Dun. Dig. 8958.

Rules of judicial construction require that so far as possible conflicting provisions of a city charter be harmonized in conformity with announced legislative policy of state. State v. Erickson, 190M216, 251NW519. See Dun. Dig. 8951.

Fundamental rules of construction of statutes is to give effect to intention of legislature as expressed in language used. Id. See Dun. Dig. 8940.

Where there is a conflict, law later in point of original enactment will control. Id. See Dun. Dig. 8961.

Where facts are undisputed and provisions of ordinance are unambiguous and stated in clear language,

we cannot, by construction, change its terms or result of its application to facts. *Zalk & Josephs Realty Co. v. S.*, 191M60, 253NW8. See Dun. Dig. 1595.

The maxim *expressio unius* does not apply to constitutions with the same force that it does to statutes. *Reed v. B.*, 191M254, 253NW102. See Dun. Dig. 1576.

Ordinances and statutes must be given a reasonable and practical construction in accordance with intention of law makers. *State v. Witt's Market House*, 191M425, 254NW596. See Dun. Dig. 8939, 8945.

Rule of practical construction of statutes is not entitled to much weight against state in determining taxability of property. *Board of Education v. B.*, 192M367, 256NW894. See Dun. Dig. 8952.

It will be presumed that legislature intended an amendment to make some change in the law. *State v. City of Eveleth*, 194M44, 260NW223. See Dun. Dig. 8997.

Common usage can be resorted to in interpreting statute. *Bennett Commission Co. v. N.*, 195M7, 261NW593. See Dun. Dig. 8968.

If language of statute is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, the one rendering it constitutional must be adopted. *State v. Montague*, 195M278, 262NW684. See Dun. Dig. 8931, 8950.

A dominant rule of statutory construction is to discover and give effect to legislative purpose. To discover that purpose, object sought to be accomplished should be given great consideration. *North Shore Fish & Freight Co. v. N.*, 195M336, 263NW98. See Dun. Dig. 8940.

Courts may consider what might happen under statute to be construed if given construction contended for. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8947.

Meaning should be given to every portion of a document or statute. *State v. Goodrich*, 195M644, 264NW234. See Dun. Dig. 8951.

Where there is ambiguity, whole instrument or document should be considered in construction. *Id.*

Where a statute has been judicially construed, especially when administrative and executive officers charged with its enforcement have acquiesced therein over a long period of time, such construction becomes a part thereof, and its meaning and import are measured thereby. *Bemis Bro. Bag Co. v. W.*, 197M216, 266NW690. See Dun. Dig. 8952.

A statute must be construed so as to be practicable if that is possible. *Taxes Delinquent*, 197M266, 266NW867. See Dun. Dig. 8939.

Both constitutional and statutory declarations are to be interpreted in light of tacit assumptions upon which it is reasonable to suppose that language was used. *State v. Flores*, 197M590, 268NW194. See Dun. Dig. 8940.

When language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction. *Hall Hardware Co. v. G.*, 197M619, 268NW202. See Dun. Dig. 8938, 8950, 8951.

Statutes are to be so construed as to suppress mischief and advance remedy, to promote rather than defeat legislative purpose. *State v. Sobelman*, 199M232, 271NW484. See Dun. Dig. 8962.

Clear and express purpose of legislature cannot be disregarded. *Van Sloun v. D.*, 199M434, 272NW271. See Dun. Dig. 8938.

Such construction should be adopted as will give effect to obvious legislative intent. *Knudson v. A.*, 199M479, 272NW376. See Dun. Dig. 8937(95).

A construction resulting in absurdity, injustice, or inconvenience is to be avoided if language used will reasonably bear any other construction. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8947.

Court must construe statute as a whole and give effect to all of its parts. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8951.

Practical construction of a statute by the bar for a long time is entitled to some weight, and in matters of practice it is entitled to great weight. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8952.

Statutes are presumed not to make any alteration in common law further or otherwise than they expressly declare and existing common law remedies are not to be taken away by a statute unless by express enactment or necessary implication. *State v. St. Cloud Milk Producers' Ass'n*, 200M1, 273NW603. See Dun. Dig. 8958.

Practical construction placed on taxing statutes by assessors, Tax Commission, and Attorney General, should have weight with courts. *Holmes v. B.*, 200M97, 273NW623. See Dun. Dig. 8952, 9177.

Act is to be liberally construed to give effect to real intent of legislature. *Colosimo v. G.*, 199M600, 273NW632. See Dun. Dig. 8940.

Ascertainment of legislative intent is aim sought in construing language of doubtful meaning whether that be employed in statutes or ordinances, and rules of interpretation are but guides to aid court in arriving at true intent. *Burns*, 200M191, 273NW691. See Dun. Dig. 8939, 8940.

Construction of statute must be reasonable, such as language used will reasonably bear. It must be practical. Questions involving government must not be determined along technical lines, but practical considerations should control. *Id.*

If intent of legislature is clearly expressed in plain and unambiguous language in a statute, court must give effect thereto, and, in absence of manifest mistake, such a statute is not one requiring construction. *Gullings v. S.*, 200M115, 273NW703. See Dun. Dig. 8938.

While a penal statute is to be strictly construed, such construction cannot be contrary to language used. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8989.

Ordinary function of a proviso is to exempt something from a statute which would otherwise be within its provisions, and it must be construed in harmony with remainder of statute. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8996.

A statute is to be enforced literally as it reads if its language embodies a definite meaning which involves no absurdity or contradiction. *Peterson v. H.*, 200M253, 273NW812. See Dun. Dig. 8938.

Although a statute be remedial in its terms and purposes, and as such to be liberally construed, court is without power to change plain language thereof by construing it so as to mean something different from what is clearly stated. *Id.*

Operation of statutes is often extended, by construction, to matters of subsequent creation and applied to conditions that accrue after their passage as well as to those that existed before. *Equality Tp. v. S.*, 200M316, 274NW219. See Dun. Dig. 8943.

A construction of a statute which would result in absurdity, injustice, or inconvenience is to be avoided if language used will reasonably bear any other construction. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8943, 8947.

Construction of a statute should be sensible. *State v. Schultz*, 200M363, 274NW401. See Dun. Dig. 8947.

Where act provided for is merely incidental and subsidiary to some chief purpose of law and is not designed for protection of third persons and statute does not declare consequences of a failure of compliance, statute will ordinarily be construed as directory and not mandatory. *Wenger v. W.*, 200M436, 274NW517. See Dun. Dig. 8954.

Words "shall", "must", are not always to be construed in a statute as being mandatory. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8979.

Judicial construction of a statute is as much a part thereof as if it had been written into it originally. *Zochrisen v. R.*, 200M383, 274NW536. See Dun. Dig. 8936b.

Construction of a statute must be reasonable and practical, and broad and practical considerations should control. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8939.

The legislative intent is not to be made to depend upon the collocation or arrangement of words alone, but upon reason and sense of thing, as indicated by entire context and subject-matter. *Rosenfield v. M.*, 201M113, 275NW698. See Dun. Dig. 8951.

An existing common-law remedy is not to be taken away by a statute unless by direct enactment or necessary implication. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8957.

Courts are not permitted by construction to carry a statute, particularly one in derogation of the common law, beyond its clearly defined scope. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8958.

A statute is to be enforced literally as it reads, if its language embodies a definite meaning which involves no absurdity or contradiction. *Lowe v. R.*, 201M280, 276NW224. See Dun. Dig. 8938.

Construction of a statute may be determined by its subject-matter, objects, and history. *First Minneapolis Trust Co.*, 202M187, 277NW899. See Dun. Dig. 8962, 8965.

Word "may" is not always used in statutes to express a directory meaning. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8979.

Use of word "shall" is not decisive as to whether a statutory provision is directory or mandatory. *Jerome v. B.*, 202M485, 279NW237. See Dun. Dig. 8979(89, 91).

Construction will be given a city ordinance that will not lead to absurdity or injustice. *State v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co.*, 202M605, 279NW407. See Dun. Dig. 8947(49).

Practical construction placed on a statute by executive or administrative officers, or the legislature, and long acquiesced in by people, is entitled to great weight. *Equitable Holding Co. v. E.*, 202M529, 279NW736. See Dun. Dig. 8952(69, 70, 71).

Practical construction put on statute by authorities charged with its administration during a long period of time, known to legislative department and no effort being made to change statute, should not be set aside by court. *State v. Crookston Trust Co.*, 203M512, 282NW138. See Dun. Dig. 8952.

Intention of a remedial statute will always prevail over literal sense of its terms, and when expression is special or particular, but reason is general, expression should be deemed general. *Minn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. S.*, 204M101, 282NW658. See Dun. Dig. 8943(26, 27).

Where a statute contains a separability clause declaring that the act would have been passed irrespective of the unconstitutionality of invalidity thereof, unconstitutionality of an exclusion does not affect other parts of act, at least where remaining portions constitute an operative statute. *Mesaba Loan Co. v. S.*, 203M589, 282NW823. See Dun. Dig. 8936.

Words and phrases which have acquired an established meaning by judicial construction are deemed to be used in same sense in a subsequent statute relating to same subject matter. *Jones v. P.*, 204M333, 283NW535. See Dun. Dig. 8966.

Rule that after courts have once said that legislature meant a certain thing by certain language, legislature will be deemed to have intended same meaning by again using same language, applies to bankruptcy acts. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8966.

An enactment of a legislative body should be liberally construed in favor of constitutionality. *Sverkerson v. C.*, 204M388, 283NW555. See Dun. Dig. 8907.

If on its face or in application to its subject matter meaning of a statute is plain, it is not permissible to resort to an extraneous aid to construction, such as rule

that a statute is to be construed, if possible, as to make it constitutional. *Trustees of Pillsbury Academy v. S.*, 204M365, 283NW727. See Dun. Dig. 8938.

A statute should be construed as it reads, and effect given to clear meaning of its language. *State v. Minneapolis Fire Department Relief Ass'n*, 285NW479. See Dun. Dig. 8968.

A statute in derogation of common law should receive "a fair construction, with the purpose of its enactment in view," rather than a "strict construction" which limits or defeats that purpose. *Teders v. R.*, 286NW353. See Dun. Dig. 8958.

When confronted with a statute which is susceptible of different interpretations, court must accept that one which is in conformity with purpose of act and in harmony with constitution. *State v. Probate Court*, 287NW297. See Dun. Dig. 8943.

Statutes must be so construed as to give effect to every section and part, and when any doubts arise as to constitutionality thereof such doubts must be resolved in favor of law. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8995.

Provision in legislative act declaring all provisions to be inseparable and that if any clause is invalid, then whole act shall be invalid will be considered by the court to determine intent of legislature but court is not necessarily controlled thereby. *Op. Atty. Gen.* (724r), Feb. 21, 1935.

Practical construction of statutes. 20MinnLawRev56. Rule against retroactive legislation as a basic principle of jurisprudence. 20MinnLawRev775.

Construction of tax statutes. 23MinnLawRev107. Application of rule of ejusdem generis to penal statutes. 23MinnLawRev545.

1. Judicial duty and policy.

A court will pass upon the constitutionality of a law only when necessary. 181M427, 232NW737. See Dun. Dig. 8930a.

Court must consider act valid until satisfied to contrary beyond a reasonable doubt. *Sweet v. R.*, 189M489, 250NW466. See Dun. Dig. 8931.

Every presumption is in favor of constitutionality of act of legislature and an act should not be declared unconstitutional except when court is satisfied, after most careful consideration, that it conflicts with some provision of state or Federal Constitution. *Reed v. B.*, 191M254, 253NW102. See Dun. Dig. 8929.

When a statute is challenged for unconstitutionality, it is the duty of the court to so construe it as to render it constitutional if it is possible to do so, though it may not virtually rewrite an unambiguous law. *Moses v. O.*, 192M173, 255NW617. See Dun. Dig. 8931.

Rules of statutory construction should not be enforced inflexibly, not being masters but rather servants of courts as aids in determining legislative intent. *Board of Education v. B.*, 192M367, 256NW894. See Dun. Dig. 8937.

Construction of bankruptcy act by United States Supreme Court prevails over any contrary interpretation by state courts. *Landy v. M.*, 193M252, 258NW573. See Dun. Dig. 738.

An intent to change the law will not be lightly inferred from a mere change of phraseology in a revision. *Gilroy's Estate*, 193M349, 258NW584. See Dun. Dig. 8961.

Court must take statute as it finds it and is not at liberty to add to it by a process which would be an amendment, and, in effect, judicial legislation. *Ross v. S.*, 193M407, 258NW582. See Dun. Dig. 8940.

Where evidence showed that defendant deliberately pointed gun at wife and shot her, court did not err in refusing to submit manslaughter. *State v. Norton*, 194M410, 260NW502. See Dun. Dig. 2486.

Courts will not declare a law unconstitutional unless it clearly appears that it violates one or more provisions of constitution. *State v. Scott County*, 195M111, 261NW863. See Dun. Dig. 8929.

Statute will not be construed so as to render it unconstitutional when it is open to a construction which is fair, reasonable, and wholly consistent with the constitution. *North Shore Fish & Freight Co. v. N.*, 195M336, 263NW98. See Dun. Dig. 8950.

A revision of an existing statute is presumed not to have changed meaning, even if there be phraseological alterations, unless an intention to change clearly appears from language of revised statute when considered in connection with subject-matter of act and its legislative history. *Champ v. B.*, 197M49, 266NW94. See Dun. Dig. 8957.

Where meaning of revised statute is free from ambiguity, prior law cannot be resorted to for purpose of creating ambiguity. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8961.

Fact that validity of city ordinance has not been raised on many appeals in other cases does not prevent raising of that issue in a particular case, but such fact may be taken into consideration in determining validity. *State v. Davis*, 197M381, 267NW210. See Dun. Dig. 1579.

Power of court to declare a law unconstitutional is to be exercised only when absolutely necessary in particular case, and then with great caution. *Muller v. T.*, 197M608, 268NW204. See Dun. Dig. 8929, 8930, 8931.

Every law is presumed constitutional in the first instance. An act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its invalidity clearly appears. *Id.*

Court is bound by construction placed upon statute of another state by supreme court of that state. *Thorsness v. W.*, 198M270, 269NW637. See Dun. Dig. 8994.

Statutes are to be so construed as to suppress mischief and advance remedy, to promote rather than defeat

legislative purpose. *State v. Bean*, 199M16, 270NW918. See Dun. Dig. 8962.

Construction of a statute which will nullify it, in whole or in part, is to be avoided if reasonably possible. *Tomasko v. C.*, 200M69, 273NW628. See Dun. Dig. 8950(63).

Courts will give full effect to legislative intent to change common law fundamentals, but the intention must be at least reasonably clear. *Kemerer v. S.*, 201M239, 276NW228. See Dun. Dig. 8958, 8967.

It is duty of court so to construe statutory enactments as to give effect to obvious legislative intent. *McSherry v. C.*, 202M102, 277NW541. See Dun. Dig. 8937, 8937a, 8940, 8951.

Re-enactment of a statute after it has been construed by courts adopts such construction as part of statute. *First Minneapolis Trust Co.*, 202M187, 277NW899. See Dun. Dig. 8936b.

Court does not pass on constitutionality of a statute not challenged upon that ground. *Williams v. M.*, 202M402, 278NW585. See Dun. Dig. 8930a.

Constitutionality of a statute or ordinance will be determined only when absolutely necessary in order to determine merits of case. *State v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co.*, 202M605, 279NW407. See Dun. Dig. 8930a.

The presumption is that every law is constitutional and that lawmakers have kept within constitutional limits, and that they were possessed of full information concerning matters in respect of which legislation relates. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8929.

It is presumed that legislative body investigated and found conditions such that legislation which it enacted was appropriate. *Sverkerson v. C.*, 204M388, 283NW555. See Dun. Dig. 1605.

There is a presumption in favor of constitutionality of a city ordinance. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8765.

Judicial interpretation cannot operate until law making department of state has spoken intelligibly. *State v. Probate Court*, 287NW297. See Dun. Dig. 8930.

An imperfectly drawn statute is valid if it contains a competent and official expression of legislative will. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 8931.

2. Who may question validity.

A litigant may be heard to question the constitutionality of a statute only when it is about to be applied to his disadvantage. 181M427, 232NW737. See Dun. Dig. 8935(79).

Public officials who have no personal pecuniary interest in the matter involved will not be permitted to raise the question of the constitutionality of a statute to avoid the performance of a ministerial duty which it clearly imposes upon them. 181M427, 232NW737. See Dun. Dig. 8935(78).

One who is not a member of a class excluded from a statute, and whose rights are not affected or prejudiced thereby, may not attack statute upon ground that exclusion is unconstitutional. *Mesaba Loan Co. v. S.*, 204M589, 282NW823. See Dun. Dig. 8935.

3. Repeal.

See notes under §10929.

Where two inconsistent statutes are enacted at same session of Legislature, first must give way to last as latest expression of lawmaking power. *State v. Schmelpfenig*, 192M55, 255NW258. See Dun. Dig. 8927.

Before it can be said that a later act is intended as a substitute for earlier, there must be unmistakable intent manifested on part of legislature to make new act a substitute for old and to contain all law on subject. *State v. Sobelman*, 199M232, 271NW484. See Dun. Dig. 8926(15).

In absence of declaration of other legislative intent, where statute amends former statute by re-enacting its terms with supplementary provisions, such act is not a repeal of previous act, but amended statute is merged in amending statute and the repeal of latter does not revive first statute. *State v. Elmquist*, 201M403, 276NW735. See Dun. Dig. 8923.

A law is not repealed by a later enactment if provisions of two laws are not irreconcilable or necessarily inconsistent. *Licha v. N.*, 201M427, 276NW813. See Dun. Dig. 8927.

Where two acts are not in expressed terms repugnant, but later act covers whole subject matter of earlier, not purporting to amend it, and plainly shows that it was intended as a substitute for the earlier, it will operate as a repeal thereof, though all provisions of two may not be repugnant, but there must be unmistakable intent manifested to make new act a substitute for old act. *Lind v. O.*, 204M30, 282NW661. See Dun. Dig. 8926.

Implied repeals are no more favored in charter amendments than in statutory amendments. *Tamte v. E.*, 285NW720. See Dun. Dig. 8927.

Rule of construction that an amendatory act providing that amended act shall read as follows and then setting forth amendment repeals all of amended act not re-enacted is no obstacle to application of rule that erroneous references in amendatory act identifying amended statute may be corrected or eliminated by construction to conform to legislative intent. *Bull v. K.*, 286NW311. See Dun. Dig. 8928.

Upon repeal of a special law, general law which had been superseded by temporary special legislation becomes self-operating. *Op. Atty. Gen.* (3390-5), Aug. 24, 1937.

10933. Particular words and phrases.

6.

Act to establish October 12th as Columbus Day. Laws 1931, c. 175, ante, §2883-2.
Act to establish October 9' as Leif Erikson Day. Laws 1931, c. 120, ante, §2883-1.

14. **Published and posted notices.**—Unless otherwise specially provided, the words "Published notice," when used in reference to the giving of notice in any proceeding or the serving of any summons, order or process in judicial proceedings, shall mean the publication in full of the notice or other paper referred to, in the regular issues of a qualified newspaper, once in each week, and at uniform intervals, for the number of weeks specified. Provided, however, that when one of the regular publication days for such notice, summons, order or process shall fall upon Thanksgiving Day or upon any legal holiday then and in that case it shall be a compliance with the law to have said notice, summons, order or process published either the day before or the day after Thanksgiving Day or such legal holiday. And a "qualified newspaper" shall be one published in the county wherein the action or proceeding is pending or in which the thing to which such notice relates is to occur or be done, and conforming to the requirements of §10935; or, if there be none in such county, then in an adjoining county. The term "posted notice," when similarly used, shall mean the posting, at the beginning of the prescribed period of notice, of a copy of the notice or document referred to, in a manner likely to attract attention, in each of three of the most public places in the town, city, district or county to which the subject matter of the notice relates, or in which the thing of which notice is given is to occur or be performed; provided, however, that in any town in which there is located within its geographical limits a city or village, one or more such notices may be posted in such city or village. (As amended Apr. 16, 1931, c. 181, §1.)

(2).

The word "town" contained in par. 2 of this section is not broad enough to authorize the treasurer of a village to take steps relative to depositories of village funds as provided for in Laws 1931, c. 216, secs. 1 to 4. Op. Atty. Gen., Jan. 24, 1933.

(4).

Each letter or combination of letters representing an abbreviation of a word should be counted as one word in determining what constitutes a folio. Op. Atty. Gen. (373b-10), Jan. 4, 1937.

(6).

Farmers' Implement Co. v. Sandberg, 132Minn389, 157 NW642, holding that the service of summons on a legal holiday confers no jurisdiction on the court, followed. Chapman v. F., 184M318, 238NW637. See Dun. Dig. 4191 (82).

Public business transacted on a legal holiday is legal in case of necessity, existence of which will be presumed in absence of a showing to contrary. Ingelson v. O., 199 M422, 272NW270. See Dun. Dig. 3433, 3436, 9064.

A notice of appeal from probate court to district court is not "process," and service on election day is not prohibited. Dahmen's Estate, 200M55, 273NW364. See Dun. Dig. 7797.

State legislature may legally transact business on Good Friday only if it brings itself within the exception of this section. Op. Atty. Gen., Apr. 12, 1933.

Legislature may legally transact business on Good Friday only in cases of necessity. Op. Atty. Gen., Apr. 12, 1933.

Depositors' meeting should not be called on Good Friday. Id.

Proceedings to vacate highway had upon Nov. 11, were valid. Op. Atty. Gen., May 3, 1933.

Board of basic science may conduct examination on New Year's day, a legal holiday. Op. Atty. Gen. (303b), Oct. 5, 1934.

When last day of filing as a candidate at primary falls on a legal holiday, last day for filing affidavits of candidacy is preceding secular day. Op. Atty. Gen. (911a-1), Jan. 27, 1937.

A deed to the state executed and acknowledged on a legal holiday is valid and entitled to record. Op. Atty. Gen. (131c), Apr. 7, 1937.

Where memorial day falls on Sunday, custom of observing following day as memorial day does not warrant treasurer in accepting payment of first half of taxes without penalty on June 1st. Op. Atty. Gen. (276f), May 26, 1937.

Primary election should not be held on Washington's birthday. Op. Atty. Gen. (64), Jan. 11, 1938.

Public business may be transacted on Monday when legal holiday falls on Sunday. Op. Atty. Gen. (276c), Jan. 5, 1939.

(8).

Word "issue" must be given meaning of lineal descendants as defined in this section, but such definition relates to descent of estates of intestates and does not pertain to the interpretation of wills or deeds of trust. Thompson's Estate, 202M648, 279NW574. See Dun. Dig. 1027a.

(11).

A corporation may be owner of an exclusive liquor store. Op. Atty. Gen. (218g-13), May 22, 1934.

Word "person" in statute relating to embalming and licensing does not include corporation. Op. Atty. Gen. (950), Feb. 23, 1937.

(12).

Section 1266 governs in computation of population in cities for purpose of issuing intoxicating liquor licenses. Op. Atty. Gen., Jan. 30, 1934.

Though ordinarily inmates of training schools are not to be counted as residents of county, county board should accept official returns of federal or state census as basis for determining whether or not a redistricting is required, even though inmates of such schools were counted as residents. Op. Atty. Gen. (798d), Oct. 15, 1935.

Population of village for license purposes is that of last state or federal census. Op. Atty. Gen. (218g-11), June 7, 1937.

(14).

There was no ratification of sale made without proper notice by request for additional time to make redemption and consent thereto. State Bank of Loretto v. L., 198M 222, 269NW399. See Dun. Dig. 1463.

Foreclosure of a chattel mortgage by notice requires strict adherence to statutory requirements. Id. See Dun. Dig. 1460(43).

When posting was made in Minneapolis only and none in town where mortgaged property was located and had its situs, sale was invalid. Id.

Under section 31 of the Brainerd City Charter, requiring clerk to advertise in official newspaper of the city for one week for sealed proposals, one publication of the notice in the newspaper at least one week prior to the opening of the bids is sufficient. Op. Atty. Gen., June 24, 1931.

Under a statute providing that "two weeks' published notice" shall be given that bids will be received and opened, bids could be opened one week from the date of the last publication, excluding the date of publication, and including the date of opening the bid. Op. Atty. Gen., June 30, 1931.

Notices published on a legal holiday are valid. Op. Atty. Gen. (276d), June 8, 1935.

Advertisement on a date which falls on a legal holiday is valid, but one falling on Sunday is not valid. Op. Atty. Gen. (276d), Mar. 4, 1936.

In absence of provision to contrary, notices, etc., published by department of administration and finance must be published in legal newspaper. Op. Atty. Gen. (277a-10), Feb. 25, 1937.

Under statute requiring three weeks' published notice of bids, time of opening bids should be not less than one week from date of last publication. Op. Atty. Gen. (125a-17), May 7, 1937.

(17).

180M241, 230NW672.

(19).

The word "year" in §3259, forbidding more than twelve boxing exhibitions during any one year, means calendar year commencing January 1st. Op. Atty. Gen., Feb. 8, 1932.

(21).

179M349, 229NW312.
In computing the three-day period in which a bill is to be returned by the Governor in order to effect a veto thereof under Const. Art. 4, §11, Sunday, but not a holiday, is to be excluded. 172M162, 216NW200.

Liability of the bank stockholder making a transfer on November 23rd, 1925, continued to and included November 23rd, 1926. Bank of Dassel v. M., 183M127, 235NW914. See Dun. Dig. 803(11).

A cause of action alleging items of deposit received in an insolvent bank, the last one on March 7, 1924, is not barred as to such last item on March 7, 1930. The first day is excluded and the last included in the computation of time. Olesen v. R., 184M624, 238NW12. See Dun. Dig. 9625(98).

Where twentieth day after suit is commenced falls on Sunday or legal holiday, demand for change of venue under §3215 may be made on following Monday. State v. Mills, 187M287, 245NW431. See Dun. Dig. 9625, 10123.

First day was excluded and last day included in determining time of cancellation of workman's compensation insurance policy. Olson v. M., 188M307, 247NW8. See Dun. Dig. 9625.

Where an act is required to be done a specified number of days before an event, required number of days is to be computed by excluding day on which act is done and including day on which event is to occur. State v. Schmelpenig, 192M55, 255NW258. See Dun. Dig. 9625.

Publication of summons, order or process is not illegal because first publication falls on a holiday. Op. Atty. Gen., Mar. 14, 1929.

House of Representatives could not legally adjourn in the afternoon of Feb. 11, 1931, until the forenoon of Feb. 16, 1931, without the consent of the Senate, it being immaterial that February 12th is holiday. Op. Atty. Gen., Feb. 10, 1931.

In computing the five day period between the making of application for marriage license and the issuance of the license, the day on which the application is made is to be excluded and the day the license is issued is to be included. Op. Atty. Gen., Apr. 29, 1931.

Fractions of days may not be considered in determining five days after which a marriage license may be issued. Op. Atty. Gen., May 9, 1931.

General rule prescribed by this subdivision does not apply to §§386 and 387, relating to registration of voters. Op. Atty. Gen., Feb. 23, 1933.

In computing 60 days within which application may be made under §254-9, holidays are to be counted except when last day falls on a holiday, when application may be made on next succeeding business day. Op. Atty. Gen. (276B), March 3, 1939.

(22).

The word "towns" in Soldier's Preference Act includes villages. 173M485, 217NW681.

The word "village" in the proviso in Laws 1929, c. 179, does not include a "town." Op. Atty. Gen., June 6, 1929.

Village assessor should be paid same compensation as town assessor. Op. Atty. Gen., Dec. 22, 1933.

Compensation of village treasurer, under the general law, is governed by laws relating to compensation of town treasurer. Op. Atty. Gen. (456f-2), Oct. 18, 1935.

(24).

Village treasurer unable to write may sign village bonds by making his mark, or his name may be written by some person at his request and in his presence. Op. Atty. Gen. (456a), Nov. 24, 1937.

Signing of checks by deputy or clerk at direction of county treasurer is lawful, but it is doubtful that a rubber stamp signature, unless initialed or otherwise identified by handwriting, would constitute a compliance with statute. Op. Atty. Gen. (450a-16), April 17, 1939.

10934. Newspapers legalized.

A legal newspaper may refuse to publish legal notices. Op. Atty. Gen. (314h-6), Aug. 27, 1936.

Status of newspaper is not affected by failure of publication for one week. Op. Atty. Gen. (214b-6), Sept. 18, 1936.

Newspaper may completely suspend publication for period of one week without affecting its status. Op. Atty. Gen. (314b-6), July 27, 1937.

A daily paper may change to weekly or semi-weekly paper without affecting its status, but it is doubtful whether a notice which was being published on one of days that ceased to be a day of publication after change can be published on one of the other days. Id.

10934-2. Certain publications validated.—All newspaper publications of notices, required by law to be published in legal newspapers, which have been published between dates of June 27, 1927 and June 27, 1928 in a daily newspaper which conforms in all respects to the statute defining legal newspapers with the exception that the newspaper had not been published for the requisite length of time, and where said daily newspaper attempted to purchase a weekly newspaper and combine and continue the existing legal weekly paper with the daily newspaper but in fact failed to do so because of a failure to adopt certain characteristics of the existing legal newspaper, are hereby legalized and declared to be valid and sufficient for all purposes. (Act Mar. 11, 1929, c. 72, §1.)

10934-3. The provisions of this act shall not affect any action or proceeding now pending in any courts in this state. (Act Mar. 11, 1929, c. 72, §2.)

10934-4. Certain newspapers qualified and publications validated.—Any daily newspaper which was issued only five days each week during the weeks ending December 31, 1932, and January 7, 1933, respectively, and which was not issued on December 26, 1932, or January 2, 1933, shall be qualified as a medium of official and legal publications under the laws of this State, notwithstanding any failure to issue the same at least six days during each of said weeks, or failure to issue the same on December 26, 1932, or January 2, 1933, provided such daily newspaper be otherwise qualified as a medium of official and legal publications under Section 10935 Mason's Minnesota Statutes for 1927; and any official and/or legal publication or publications published in any such newspaper on or after December 26, 1932, and prior to the passage of this Act are hereby legalized and validated

and given the same legal force and effect as if published in a daily newspaper, issued daily at least six days during each of said weeks. (Act Jan. 10, 1933, c. 2.)

10934-5. Certain newspapers legalized.—No newspaper in this state, which conforms in all respects to the statutes defining a legal newspaper, except that it was not heretofore published for one week at some time since it became a legal newspaper, shall be deprived of its standing as such legal newspaper by reason of such omission; but such newspaper shall be deemed to be a legal newspaper notwithstanding such omission of its publication for one week. (Act Jan. 11, 1933, c. 4.)

10934-6. Legal publications in certain newspapers validated.—No daily newspaper in this state which conforms in all respects to the statutes defining a legal newspaper, except that it was heretofore published and issued only two days during one calendar week at some time since it became a legal newspaper, shall be deprived of its standing as such newspaper by reason of the failure to publish and issue the same at least six days during said week; but such newspaper shall be deemed to be a legal newspaper notwithstanding such failure; and any official and/or legal publication or publications published in any such newspaper subsequent to the calendar week in which such failure occurred and prior to the passage of this act are hereby legalized and validated. (Mar. 23, 1937, c. 92, §1.)

10934-7. Same.—No weekly newspaper in this state which conforms in all respects to the statutes defining a legal newspaper, except that it was not heretofore published and issued for one week at some time since it became a legal newspaper, shall be deprived of its standing as such legal newspaper by reason of such omission; but such newspaper shall be deemed to be a legal newspaper notwithstanding such omission of its publication and issuance for one week; and any official and/or legal publication or publications published in any such newspaper subsequent to the week during which such omission occurred and prior to the passage of this act are hereby legalized and validated. (Mar. 23, 1937, c. 92, §2.)

10935. Qualifications of legal newspaper. [Repealed.]

Repealed Apr. 1, 1939, c. 128, §2. Reenacted as §10935-1. Amended Apr. 4, 1933, c. 151, §1; Apr. 21, 1933, c. 373; Apr. 13, 1935, c. 166, §1 and July 15, 1937, Sp. Ses. c. 68, §1. Qualifications of official newspapers. Laws 1939, c. 128, §1.

The title of Act Apr. 21, 1933, cited, purports to amend only subdivision 4 of this section. The amendment of the other subdivisions of the section is probably unconstitutional. The title of the act reads: "An act amending Mason's Minnesota Statutes of 1927, section 10935, subdivision 4, relating to legal newspaper qualifications."

Sec. 2 of Act Apr. 4, 1933, cited, provides that the act shall take effect from its passage.

Sec. 2 of Act Apr. 13, 1935, cited, repeals Laws 1933, chapters 151 and 373.

Act July 15, 1937, cited amends only subdivision (4).

St. Paul Legal Ledger giving information affecting credit and other news of official proceedings, held to "contain local and general news, etc." Legal Ledger, Inc. v. H., 176M120, 222NW646.

Record found to sustain legality of Midway News as a qualified medium for official and legal publications, though type was set by another concern. North Central Pub. Co. v. C., 198M335, 269NW835. See Dun. Dig. 7064.

Newspaper publisher, having no mechanical equipment whatever, but letting it to job shop, does not publish legal newspaper. Op. Atty. Gen., July 21, 1932.

Laws 1933, c. 373, amending this section, operates as a curative act only, and does not permit legal newspapers complying with law at time of passage to consolidate their shops and have various papers issued from one shop. Op. Atty. Gen., Oct. 31, 1933.

If some of present work is done at place of publication and if newspaper office at that place is equipped with skilled workmen and necessary materials for preparing and printing the paper, balance of paper may be printed in the adjoining village. Op. Atty. Gen. (314b-19), Dec. 28, 1934.

County board proceedings cannot be published in a newspaper that is not legally qualified, such as one which has not been in circulation for a year. Op. Atty. Gen. (314b), Dec. 31, 1934.

Laws 1933, c. 373, is unconstitutional insofar as provisions thereof purport to amend subd. (1), (2), (3), of this section, and a newspaper is a legal paper providing it has qualified under requirements of this section for at least one year preceding passage of Laws 1935, c. 166. Op. Atty. Gen. (314b-3), May 17, 1935.

Provision for suspension of publication for not more than three months resulting from destruction of office by fire, applies to year during which newspaper is attempting to qualify as a legal newspaper. Op. Atty. Gen. (314b-6), Mar. 2, 1936.

In absence of provision to contrary, notices, etc., published by department of administration and finance must be published in legal newspaper. Op. Atty. Gen. (277a-10), Feb. 25, 1937.

Suspension of publication of a legal newspaper for a period of not more than three months resulting from destruction of office and equipment by fire or by elements or other unforeseen accident does not affect qualifications after resuming publication. Op. Atty. Gen. (314b-6), July 27, 1937.

Where office and equipment is destroyed by elements, paper would not be a legal newspaper pending reconstruction of plant if paper was printed outside county, but would be a legal paper during period of suspension if paper was printed in city and county. Id.

Neither change of ownership nor change of place of publication from one place to another within same county would deprive a paper of its standing. Op. Atty. Gen. (314b-17), Dec. 22, 1937.

A newspaper maintaining an office in village but having no printing machinery or equipment and having its paper printed in a distant village is not a legal newspaper. Op. Atty. Gen. (314B-11), March 7, 1939.

Affidavit of publication held to comply with section as amended by Laws 1939, c. 128. Op. Atty. Gen. (314B-7), June 8, 1939.

(1).

A legal newspaper need not be of any specified size, but it must be equivalent in space to at least four pages with five columns to the page, each seventeen and three-fourths inches long. Op. Atty. Gen., Dec. 3, 1931.

(2).

If all press work was done outside of known office of publication of legal newspaper, newspaper would be disqualified. Op. Atty. Gen. (314b-17), Mar. 31, 1938.

Where two weekly newspapers in same city buy a press to be used jointly and locate it in plant of one of them, both papers continue to qualify. Op. Atty. Gen. (314b-11), Apr. 19, 1938.

(3).

On change from weekly to semi-weekly, new edition is not legal newspaper until it has been published for at least one year. Op. Atty. Gen., Dec. 11, 1933.

Printer's affidavit, Form 67 in Appendix 1 (Mason's 1934 Supp.), should be modified so as to conform with requirements as to qualification of a legal newspaper as stated in Laws 1933, c. 373. Op. Atty. Gen., Feb. 1, 1934.

Where proof is not furnished county auditor within the required 10 days, the legal standing of the newspaper is forfeited, and is not reinstated by furnishing such proof 25 days after notice. Op. Atty. Gen. (314b-5), June 28, 1934.

"Person interested" is one having a direct and pecuniary interest in certain paper and in cause and consequences of an official and legal publication contained in newspaper. Op. Atty. Gen. (277a-10), Sept. 12, 1938.

10935-1. Qualifications for legal newspapers.—A newspaper in order to be qualified as a medium of official and legal publications, shall:

(1) Be printed in the English language from its known office of publication within the city, village or town from which it purports to be issued and in newspaper format and in column and sheet form equivalent in space to at least 450 running inches of single column, two inches wide.

(2) Be issued at least once each week, and if a daily at least five days each week, from a known office, established in such place for such publication and employing skilled workmen and the necessary material for preparing and printing the same; except in any week in which a legal holiday or Thanksgiving day is included, not more than four issues of a daily paper shall be necessary, which provision shall also apply when the legal holiday falls upon Sunday. Provided that the press work on that part of the newspaper devoted to local news of interest to the community which it purports to serve, shall be done in its known office of publication.

(3) 25 per cent of its news columns devoted to local news of interest to the community which it purports to serve. It may also contain general news,

comment and miscellany, and must not wholly duplicate any other publication, and be not entirely made up of patents, plate matter and advertisements.

(4) Be circulated in and near its place of publication to the extent of at least 240 copies regularly delivered to paying subscribers and have entry as second class matter in its local post-office.

(5) Have complied with all of the foregoing conditions for at least one year last past.

Provided, however, that any publication which shall have been a duly qualified medium of legal publication or which shall have filed with the proper county auditor an affidavit purporting to set forth its qualifications as a legal publication, under the laws of this state, prior to the passage of this act shall be a legal newspaper and a duly qualified medium of official and legal publication, so long as said publication complies with sub-section 4, hereof.

Suspension of publication for a period of not more than three months within any year, resulting from the destruction of its office by the elements or unforeseen accident to the equipment thereof shall not affect the qualification of such newspaper; nor shall the consolidation of one newspaper with another published in the same county, nor any change in the name or ownership thereof, disqualify it or invalidate any publication continuously made therein, before and after the change, and any change of the day of publication, the frequency of publication, or the change of office or place of publication from one place to another within the same county shall not deprive any such publication of its standing as a legal newspaper. Any person interested in the legality of any publication may request the auditor for the county in which such publication is published to furnish proof of the legal standing of the publication in which such legal publication is contained. The county auditor shall then demand of the publisher of such publication to furnish written proof of its qualifications together with a list of the two hundred forty paying subscribers, which shall be then filed by said auditor in his office as a public record. Failure of such publisher to comply with this demand within ten days after receipt of such request shall forfeit the legal standing of such publication, and such publication shall not be a medium of legal publication until such written proof and list shall have been so furnished.

All legal notices shall be printed in the English language. (Act Apr. 1, 1939, c. 128, §1.)

10937. Published notice.

Op. Atty. Gen., Mar. 14, 1929; note under §10933. Advertisement on a date which falls on a legal holiday is valid, but one falling on Sunday is not valid. Op. Atty. Gen. (276d), Mar. 4, 1936.

10939-1. Fees for publication of legal notices.

Publication of wheat production and acreage statements of members of association of county, made in compliance with regulations of agricultural adjustment administration, is not a legal publication as respects rates. Op. Atty. Gen., Nov. 8, 1933.

Publisher was not entitled to extra compensation for printing tabular matter. Op. Atty. Gen., Nov. 9, 1933.

This section does not take precedence over Laws 1895, c. 8, §146. Op. Atty. Gen., Dec. 13, 1933.

Where personal property tax list is given for publication to a newspaper without any agreement as to charges, the rate fixed by law as the limit of compensation becomes a part of the contract. Op. Atty. Gen. (277a-11), Feb. 25, 1936.

An unorganized school district is required to print financial statement by §2855, but is not controlled by any provision as to independent school districts, and charge is limited to general provision for legal notices under §10939-1, which would be 90 cents per folio. Op. Atty. Gen. (277e), August 17, 1939.

10940. Duties of State Printer—Preparation of forms.—The state expert printer shall biennially issue a pamphlet containing a description and facsimile copy, and style of composition, as near as can be, of all notices required by law to be published by public officials in a newspaper in this state, for distribution; such forms of official notices to be prepared by the attorney general before being issued for distribution by the state expert printer, and such forms when so

prepared and so issued shall become a guide for public officials in the publication of such official and legal notices in newspapers. (As amended Mar. 19, 1937, c. 78, §1.)

10950-4. Mason's Minnesota Statutes to be prima facie evidence.—Mason's Minnesota Statutes of 1927 shall be prima facie evidence of the statutes therein contained, in all the courts of this state, without further proof or authentication. (Act Feb. 1, 1929, c. 8.)

10950-5. 1931 supplement to Mason's Statutes to be prima facie evidence of the statutes therein contained.—The 1931 Supplement to Mason's Minnesota Statutes of 1927 shall be prima facie evidence of the statutes therein contained, in all the courts of this state, without further proof of authentication. (Act Apr. 15, 1933, c. 254.)

10950-6. 1934 Supplement to Mason's Minnesota Statutes of 1927 to be prima facie evidence of the statutes therein contained. The 1934 Supplement to Mason's Minnesota Statutes of 1927 shall be prima facie evidence of the Statutes therein contained. (Act Feb. 27, 1935, c. 24.)

10950-7. 1936 Supplement to Mason's Minnesota Statutes of 1927 to be prima facie evidence of the statutes therein contained.—The 1936 Supplement to Mason's Minnesota Statutes of 1927 shall be prima facie evidence of the statutes therein contained. (Act Feb. 13, 1937, c. 24.)

10950-8. 1938 Supplement to Mason's Minnesota Statutes of 1927 to be prima facie evidence of the statutes therein contained.—The 1938 Supplement to Mason's Minnesota Statutes of 1927 shall be prima facie evidence of the statutes therein contained. (Act Jan. 30, 1939, c. 4.)

CHAPTER 108

Express Repeal of Existing Laws

10962. Session Laws of 1875.

Repeal of Laws 1875, c. 139, by §10962, did not affect villages, such as Heron Lake, operating thereunder, and such laws govern repairing of sidewalks and paving of streets. Op. Atty. Gen. (484e-4), Apr. 15, 1936.

10963. Session Laws of 1876.

Repeal of ch. 23 is modified by the provisions of §7429 herein. Op. Atty. Gen., May 3, 1930.

10967. Session Laws of 1881.

Repeal of Laws 1875, c. 139, by §10962, did not affect villages, such as Heron Lake, operating thereunder, and such laws govern repairing of sidewalks and paving of streets. Op. Atty. Gen. (484e-4), Apr. 15, 1936.

10970. Session Laws of 1885.

This repealer is modified as to villages organized and operating under the village code of 1885, by §1109 herein. Op. Atty. Gen., Jan. 16, 1930.

10975. Session Laws of 1895.

This repealer is modified as to villages organized and operating under the 1885 village code, by §1109 herein. Op. Atty. Gen., Jan. 16, 1930.

Laws 1895, c. 257, authorizing villages to purchase or rent fire apparatus was not repealed by this section. Op. Atty. Gen., Oct. 6, 1931.

10978. Session Laws of 1901.

This section repeals Law 1901, c. 252. Op. Atty. Gen., Apr. 27, 1933.