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To
Mason's Minnesota Statutes
1927

(1927 to 1940)
(Superseding Mason's 1931, 1934, 1936 and 1938
Supplements)

Containing the text of the acts of the 1929, 1931, 1933, 1935, 1937 and 1939 General Sessions,
and the 1933-34, 1935-36, 1936 and 1937 Special Sessions of the Legislature, both new and
amendatory, and notes showing repeals, together with annotations from the
various courts, state and federal, and the opinions of the Attorney
General, construing the constitution, statutes, charters
and court rules of Minnesota together with digest
of all common law decisions.



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10044. Misconduct by attorneys.

This section troubles damages in actions therein referred to, but does not create any new cause of action. 181M322, 232NW515. See Dun. Dig. 674.

10047. Punishment for prohibited acts.

This section provides penalties for those sections in Laws 1931, c. 70, for which no penalty is provided in section 9 of such act. Op. Atty. Gen., Oct. 19, 1931.

If neither owner nor operator of a vehicle is a party to a strike, it is unlawful to interfere in any manner with operation of vehicle or operator thereof whether it be upon any of the public streets or highways or upon premises of any business establishment or elsewhere, and such violation is a misdemeanor within meaning of §10047 with punishment prescribed by §9922. Op. Atty. Gen. (270d-7), August 11, 1939.

10052. Other false certificates.

Civil liability for false certificate as to tax liens. 181M334, 232NW359. See Dun. Dig. 2314a.

10053. Falsely auditing and paying claims.

County auditors and other officers issuing certificates for payment of wolf bounties on fox violate both §6258 and §10053 and may be removed from office. Op. Atty. Gen. (47f), Mar. 17, 1938.

10055. Conspiracy defined—How punished.

An uneducated widow reposing confidence in a lawyer having reputation for ability and integrity was not estopped to claim conspiracy and fraud against lawyer and corporation of which he was president because she retained stock of the corporation for some years and received dividends thereon. Scheele v. U., 200M554, 274NW673. See Dun. Dig. 1562.

An uneducated investor had right to repose confidence in a lawyer having reputation for ability and integrity, as affecting conspiracy and fraud in purchase and sale of stock of a corporation of which lawyer was president. Id.

A conspiracy to defraud is ordinarily provable only by circumstantial evidence. If in end there is a completed structure of fraudulent result frame of which has been furnished piecemeal by several defendants, parts when brought together showing adaptation to each other and end accomplished, it is reasonable to draw inference of conspiracy and common intent to defraud. Id. See Dun. Dig. 1566b.

10060-1. Printing and circulating certain documents prohibited.—Any person who, not being otherwise authorized by law to do so, drafts, prepares, prints, multigraphs, mimeographs, typewrites, writes, or otherwise transcribes or duplicates; for sale, gift, distribution or other disposal, or who circulates, gives away, distributes, publishes, or offers for sale any paper or document, or any blank form of paper or document which, when the blanks thereof have been filled in, simulates or is intended to simulate a summons, complaint, writ, final or other notice, or legal, judicial or court process of any kind, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. (Act Mar. 18, 1939, c. 69, §1.)

10060-2. Exceptions.—Nothing herein contained shall prohibit the printing, publishing, giving away, sale, circulation or distribution of blank forms of legal documents for use by attorneys at law. (Act Mar. 18, 1939, c. 69, §2.)

CHAPTER 97

Crimes Against the Person

HOMICIDE

10065. Defined and classified.

Evidence that defendant was the possessor of a weapon of the kind with which a homicide was committed is not rendered incompetent by reason of the fact that it tends incidentally to prove the commission of other and unrelated offenses. 172M106, 214NW782.

State's rebuttal evidence was admissible. 172M106, 214NW782.

A conviction for homicide cannot stand on evidence of motive with nothing more; there must be enough additional evidence so that whole shows guilt beyond reasonable doubt. State v. Waddell, 187M191, 245NW140. See Dun. Dig. 4247.

10066. Proof of death, and of killing by defendant.

Burden is upon state to prove each element of corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt, and necessary elements are death of a human being and that a criminal agency produced it. State v. Voges, 197M85, 266NW265. See Dun. Dig. 4247.

In prosecution of mother of girl having a baby, evidence held insufficient to warrant a finding of any degree of homicide, there being no evidence of any one seeing the child, that it was alive when born, and was not dead when thrown into stove. Id.

It is identity of offense, and not of act, which is referred to in constitutional guarantee against putting a person twice in jeopardy. Where two or more persons are injured in their persons, though it be by a single act, yet, since consequences affect, separately, each person injured, there is a corresponding number of distinct offenses, as in separate prosecutions for homicide where two persons in same automobile were killed. State v. Fredlund, 200M44, 273NW353. See Dun. Dig. 2426.

Failure of specific proof of exact manner of death should not prevent conviction where adequate proof that death was caused by acts of accused in some manner is available. State v. Poelaert, 200M30, 273NW641. See Dun. Dig. 4247.

10067. Murder in first degree.**4. Premeditation.**

Murder in the first degree requires a premeditated design to effect death of person killed or another. State v. Norton, 194M410, 260NW502. See Dun. Dig. 4232b.

8. Evidence.

No reversible error found in reception of evidence of conversation between killer and defendant after arrest. 176M562, 223NW917.

Finding that defendant, with knowledge of killer's intent to kill, encouraged and abetted him, held justified by the evidence. 176M562, 223NW917.

Dying declarations, res gestae, and sufficiency to support conviction. 180M221, 230NW639.

Circumstantial evidence held to support conviction for first degree murder of one upon whom accused carried life insurance. State v. Waddell, 187M191, 245NW140. See Dun. Dig. 4247.

Testimony of accomplice held sufficiently corroborated to sustain conviction of murder. State v. Jackson, 198M111, 268NW924. See Dun. Dig. 4247.

Evidence supported admission of a scoop shovel with which state contended murder was committed. State v. Rowe, 280M172, 280NW646. See Dun. Dig. 4246.

That some hair similar to that of deceased was not discovered on shovel until some months later went to weight but not to admissibility of such discovery. Id.

Evidence justified conviction of murder in first degree. Id. See Dun. Dig. 4247.

10068. Murder in second degree.

Evidence sustained finding of murder in second degree. State v. Quinn, 186M242, 243NW70. See Dun. Dig. 4233.

Murder in the second degree requires a design to effect death of person killed or another, but without deliberation or premeditation. State v. Norton, 194M410, 260NW502. See Dun. Dig. 4233.

Evidence held sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty of murder in second degree. State v. Poelaert, 200M30, 273NW641. See Dun. Dig. 4233.

10070. Murder in third degree.**1. What constitutes.**

One killing another with an automobile while recklessly driving it in an intoxicated condition may be convicted of murder in the third degree. 171M414, 214NW280.

Evidence held not to require an instruction that defendant should be acquitted if he was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing. 171M414, 214NW280.

Murder in the third degree is killing of a human being, when perpetrated by acts eminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without a premeditated design to effect death of any individual, or without a design to effect death, by a person engaged in committing or attempting to commit a felony either upon or affecting the person killed or otherwise. State v. Norton, 194M410, 260NW502. See Dun. Dig. 4234.

Where the verdict was of murder in second degree, but evidence sustains conviction only in third degree, supreme court has power to direct entry of judgment accordingly. State v. Jackson, 198M111, 268NW924. See Dun. Dig. 2501.

It is identity of offense, and not of act, which is referred to in constitutional guarantee against putting a person twice in jeopardy. Where two or more persons are injured in their persons, though it be by a single act, yet, since consequences affect, separately, each per-

son injured, there is a corresponding number of distinct offenses, as in separate prosecutions for homicide where two persons in same automobile were killed. *State v. Fredlund*, 200M44, 273NW353. See Dun. Dig. 2426.

10072. [Repealed].

Repealed by Act Mar. 31, 1933, c. 130.

10072-2. [Repealed].

Repealed by Act Mar. 31, 1933, c. 130.

10073. Manslaughter defined.

State v. Quinn, 186M242, 243NW70.

In a case where a claim is made that crime of manslaughter should be submitted, instrument or weapon with which homicide is effected must be taken into consideration. *State v. Norton*, 194M410, 260NW502. See Dun. Dig. 4240a.

Where evidence showed that defendant deliberately pointed gun at wife and shot her, court did not err in refusing to submit manslaughter to jury. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 4247a.

Manslaughter by motorists. 22MinnLawRev755.

10074. Manslaughter in first degree.

Death resulting from commission of a misdemeanor. 23 MinnLawRev95.

1. Indictment.

Upon an indictment charging manslaughter in the first degree, trial court properly submitted to the jury question of manslaughter in the second degree. *State v. Stevens*, 184M286, 238NW673. See Dun. Dig. 4243.

5. Evidence.

Statement of deceased forty minutes after assault, "Oh, Mother, my head hurts me, one held me while the other hit me," held admissible. 173M410, 217NW373.

Defendant advancing good character to show improbability of his guilt is not limited to general repute but may show as a fact that he possesses a certain disposition or certain characteristics. 173M410, 217NW 373.

10075. Same.

Manslaughter in first degree is killing of a human being without a design to effect death, by a person committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor, or in heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon. *State v. Norton*, 194 M410, 260NW502. See Dun. Dig. 4240a.

Where there was evidence from which it could be inferred that deceased was approaching in a threatening manner with a pitchfork when shot, court erred in not submitting manslaughter in first degree. *State v. Klym*, 204M57, 282NW655. See Dun. Dig. 4240a.

10076. Killing of unborn child or mother.—Every person who shall wilfully kill an unborn quick child by an injury inflicted upon the person of its mother, and every person who shall provide, supply, or administer to a woman, whether pregnant or not, or who shall prescribe for, advise, or procure a woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance, or who shall use or employ, or cause to be used or employed, any instrument or other means, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of a woman, unless the same is necessary to preserve her life, or that of the child with which she is pregnant, and the death of the woman, or that of any quick child of which she is pregnant, is thereby produced, shall be guilty of manslaughter in the first degree. (R. L. '05, 4882; G. S. '13, §8610; Apr. 5, 1935, c. 108.)

Admission of testimony as to conversation had with deceased after performance of illegal operation held not prejudicial error, since defendant was in no way mentioned in conversation testified to. *State v. Zabrocki*, 194M 346, 260NW507. See Dun. Dig. 4240a.

In prosecution for manslaughter because of death of a female on whom defendant had performed an illegal operation, evidence held sufficient to sustain verdict of guilty. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 4240a.

Venue in abortion cases involving accomplices. *Op. Atty. Gen.* (133b-3), Oct. 15, 1935.

10078. Manslaughter in second degree.

State v. Stevens, 184M286, 238NW673; note under § 10074.

Automobilist held properly convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. 175M537, 221NW899.

Conviction of manslaughter for culpable negligence in running down pedestrian on street, held sustained by evidence. 179M1, 228NW171.

Evidence held to support conviction for death of person by culpable negligence. 181M68, 231NW721.

Evidence sustains a conviction of manslaughter in the second degree. *State v. Stevens*, 184M286, 238NW673. See Dun. Dig. 4241.

Evidence held to sustain conviction for manslaughter in second degree arising out of negligent operation of automobile. *State v. Geary*, 184M387, 239NW158. See Dun. Dig. 4241.

Indictment held sufficient to charge manslaughter in second degree as against one operating an automobile. *State v. Geary*, 184M387, 239NW158. See Dun. Dig. 4244.

Commission or attempt to commit a misdemeanor affecting personal property of another is not an element of crime of manslaughter in the second degree. *State v. Warren*, 201M369, 276NW655. See Dun. Dig. 4241.

10080. Homicide by other person, justifiable when.

State v. Quinn, 186M242, 243NW70.

1. Self-defense.

Burden of proving self-defense is not upon defendant. *State v. Quinn*, 186M242, 243NW70. See Dun. Dig. 4245.

Instruction that law does not permit the taking of a human life to repel a mere trespass as in this case was erroneous as in effect telling jury that law of self defense was not applicable, and was erroneous where there was evidence the deceased was approaching defendant in a threatening manner with a pitchfork. *State v. Klym*, 204M57, 282NW655. See Dun. Dig. 4245.

Extent of right in one who is the aggressor. 20Minn LawRev433.

ASSAULT

10097. Assault in first degree defined—How punished.

Sufficiency of identification of accused. 179M516, 229 NW789.

Evidence, held to support conviction. Expert testimony as to signature of person purchasing revolver, held properly received in evidence. 181M28, 231NW411.

Evidence held to warrant conviction of first degree assault though defendant was not present at time of assault, being a member of a racketeering gang. *State v. Barnett*, 193M336, 258NW508. See Dun. Dig. 534.

An essential element of an assault is violence, either threatened or offered. It is frequently defined as an intentional attempt, by violence, to do an injury to person of another. *State v. Nelson*, 199M86, 271NW114. See Dun. Dig. 534.

In prosecution for conspiracy to assault against one not present at time of assault, evidence that defendant was member of racketeering gang and had made threats against complaining witness was admissible. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 541, 2468.

In prosecution for conspiracy to assault, evidence that associates of defendant have made threats against complaining witness was admissible. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 2450.

Landlord shooting windows out of his own house for purpose of forcing tenants to move but without intending to injure anyone could be prosecuted for firing gun in public place but would not be guilty of assault. *Op. Atty. Gen.* (494b-4), Aug. 29, 1934.

Action for damages.

Evidence held to sustain a verdict for \$2,000 damages for a willful, wanton and malicious assault. *Goin v. P.* 196M74, 264NW219. See Dun. Dig. 531.

Expenses of medical treatment are proper items to be considered in assessing compensatory damages for assault. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 2572.

10098. Assault in second degree defined—How punished.

1. What constitutes in general.

Assault upon a de facto officer to prevent a lawful arrest is an assault in the second degree under this section. 174M565, 219NW877.

It is sufficient if the intended "felony" is involved in the offender's conduct in his relation towards some person or persons other than the one actually assaulted. *State v. Jankowitz*, 175M409, 221NW533.

The word "willfully" means evil intent or bad purpose, but does not require a specific intent to inflict grievous bodily injury. 178M589, 228NW164.

Whether defendant inflicted grievous bodily harm, held for jury. 178M589, 228NW164.

2. What constitutes assault armed with dangerous weapon.

Landlord shooting windows out of his own house for purpose of forcing tenants to move but without intending to injure anyone could be prosecuted for firing gun in public place but would not be guilty of assault. *Op. Atty. Gen.* (494b-4), Aug. 29, 1934.

3. Indictment.

Where one of a number engaged in highjacking liquor shot prosecuting witness and it is unknown which one fired shot, anyone of them may be prosecuted under an information for aiding and abetting John Doe, but any of them may also be informed against as principals. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, Feb. 15, 1933.

An information could not join an assault inflicting grievous bodily harm with an assault with intent to rob. *Op. Atty. Gen.* (494a-1), Dec. 26, 1935.

ROBBERY

10101. Defined.

Positive identification of defendant by two of holdup victims and corroborating testimony of two other witnesses for state was sufficient to warrant a finding of guilty, even though witnesses for defendant testified that

on date of robbery defendant was in another state. *State v. Chick*, 192M539, 257NW280. See Dun. Dig. 8491.

There is a distinction between robbery and larceny, and the theft of several articles at the same time and place by the same act constitutes a single offense whether the articles belong to the same owner or to different owners. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, Dec. 15, 1931.

Where partners in a store are robbed, and robber takes money from the persons of each and from the store till, three offenses are committed, and there should be three separate indictments. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, Dec. 15, 1931.

Where two or more persons are robbed at the same time, a separate offense is committed as to each and separate indictments are necessary. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, Dec. 15, 1931.

10102. In first degree, how punished.

Conviction for robbery in taking shotgun by force during attempt to rob held sustained by evidence. 173M232, 217NW104.

Evidence in relation to weapons and shells found at the time of defendant's arrest was properly received in prosecution for taking shotgun. 173M232, 217NW104.

Evidence held to support conviction and rulings on evidence approved. 179M301, 229NW99.

Evidence, held to present a question for the jury as to the identity of defendant. 181M203, 232NW111. See Dun. Dig. 2468d, 2477.

Evidence held to support verdict of robbery in first degree. *State v. Stockton*, 186M33, 242NW344. See Dun. Dig. 8491.

10103. Same.

179M532, 229NW787.

10104. In second degree, how punished.

A second degree conviction may be had under an indictment charging robbery in the first degree upon the customary allegation as to the use of force and violence. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, Dec. 15, 1931.

10106. Life imprisonment for bank robbers.

Statute is constitutional. 171M158, 213NW735.

Charge held not objectionable as permitting conviction of crime other than that charged. 171M158, 213NW735.

Admissibility and sufficiency of evidence. 171M158, 213NW735.

Evidence justified in finding of participation in robbery of bank. 177M363, 225NW278.

Statute applies to bandits who enter bank when there is no human being there and commit robbery when employees arrive. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, May 24, 1933.

Judge has power to fix a maximum sentence of less than life for robbery of a bank. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, Nov. 25, 1933.

LIBEL AND SLANDER

10112. Libel defined—Gross misdemeanor, etc.

1. What constitutes.

See notes under §9164, note 22.

A paragraph in a letter to law firm "We now learn that said L. solicited each of these stockholders in an attempt to get them to entrust their affairs to you and L." held not libelous per se as charging solicitation. *Brill v. M.*, 200M454, 274NW631. See Dun. Dig. 5509, 5520.

A paragraph in a letter to law firm "It is obvious that the real purpose of L. and yourselves is to create all the trouble that you can and if your efforts should produce anything, the real beneficiaries would be L. and yourselves and not the stockholders whom you purport to represent." held libelous per se. *Id.*

Statements contained in letter held not to constitute criminal libel. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, Sept. 1, 1933.

2. Indictment.

In a prosecution for criminal libel, where indictment charges that libelous matter was published of and con-

cerning a person or persons named, it need not otherwise state the extrinsic facts to show that language used applied to person or persons named in indictment as being libeled. Such extrinsic facts are to be shown by evidence at trial. *State v. Cramer*, 193M344, 258NW525. See Dun. Dig. 4384.

Where a libelous article charges a named voluntary unincorporated association of persons with wrongdoing, the libel applies to the members of such association, although not specifically named in the article. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 4360.

Where an indictment for libel sufficiently charges that libelous language tended to and did expose persons named therein as having been libeled, to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and obloquy, and caused them to be shunned and avoided, a further but insufficient charge as to injury to business and occupation of such persons may be disregarded as surplusage. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 4364.

10114. Publication defined.

There is no liability for sending a libelous letter to the person defamed, though a third person reads the letter. 181M364, 232NW625. See Dun. Dig. 5507(67).

10115. Liability of editors and others.

Recent developments in newspaper libel. 13MinnLaw Rev21.

10120. Slander of women.

Op. Atty. Gen., Jan. 11, 1930.

10123. Slander.

Op. Atty. Gen., Jan. 11, 1930.

10123-1. Lewd, scandalous and defamatory newspaper.

Hague v. C.I.O. (CCA3), 101F(2d)774, aff'g (DC-NJ), 25FSupp127.

This act [§§10123-1 to 10123-3] does not violate Const., art. 1, §§3, 4. 174M457, 219NW770.

This act is constitutional. *State v. Gullford*, 179M40, 228NW326. Reversed by U. S. Sup. Ct., 283US697, 51SCR 625.

Power of state to enjoin publication of a newspaper as public nuisance. 14MinnLawRev787.

10123-3. Same—Trial—Injunction—Contempt.

There is no right to a jury trial. 174M457, 219NW770.

10123-4. Certain statements to be unlawful.—It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to falsely and maliciously state, utter, publish or cause to be falsely and maliciously stated, uttered, or published, any report, rumor or statement directly or indirectly tending to disclose that any bank, public or savings institution is in an existing or probable insolvent financial condition. (Act Apr. 17, 1929, c. 212, §1.)

10123-5. Violation a gross misdemeanor.—Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of Section 1 hereof shall be deemed guilty of a gross misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail of any county wherein such false, slanderous declarations are made or published, for a term of not less than 30 days nor more than 6 months or by a fine of not less than \$100.00 or both. (Act Apr. 17, 1929, c. 212, §2.)

Each single statement or utterance would constitute a separate offense. Disclosure of truth concerning a bank would not be an offense. The rules of law with respect to malice in the law of libel and slander applies. Form of complaint suggested. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, Jan. 11, 1930.

CHAPTER 98

Crimes Against Morality, Decency, Etc.

RAPE—ABDUCTION—CARNAL ABUSE, ETC.

10124. Rape.

1. What constitutes.

One acquitted of charge of rape where age of female is not alleged in indictment may again be tried for same act on same facts under an indictment charging carnal knowledge and abuse of a female child under eighteen years of age. *State v. Winger*, 204M164, 282NW819. See Dun. Dig. 8229.

4. Evidence.

Guilt held for jury. 171M187, 213NW740.

Evidence held to warrant a conviction for attempt to rape 14 year old girl. 171M173, 213NW923.

Evidence held to sustain conviction. 172M226, 215NW 189.

Defendant in rape prosecution who undertakes to prove chastity of a young girl should be required to offer rather definite proof thereof. *State v. Brown*, 185M446, 241NW591. See Dun. Dig. 8243a.

In prosecution for rape, court did not err in refusing to admit evidence that complainant on some occasions drank liquor, smoked cigarettes and attended dances, and was somewhat indiscreet in her behavior. *State v. Brown*, 185M446, 241NW591. See Dun. Dig. 8231.

Evidence held to sustain conviction of attempt to rape. *State v. Brown*, 185M446, 241NW591. See Dun. Dig. 8235.